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Abstract
Empirical evidence has confirmed that quantum effects occur frequently also outside the microscopic
domain, while quantum structures satisfactorily model various situations in several areas of science,
including biological, cognitive and social processes. In this paper, we elaborate a quantum mechanical
model which faithfully describes the Ellsberg paradox in economics, showing that the mathematical
formalism of quantum mechanics is capable to represent the ambiguity present in this kind of situations,
because of the presence of contextuality. Then, we analyze the data collected in a concrete experiment we
performed on the Ellsberg paradox and work out a complete representation of them in complex Hilbert
space. We prove that the presence of quantum structure is genuine, that is, interference and superposition
in a complex Hilbert space are really necessary to describe the conceptual situation presented by Ellsberg.
Moreover, our approach sheds light on ‘ambiguity laden’ decision processes in economics and decision
theory, and allows to deal with different Ellsberg-type generalizations, e.g., the Machina paradox.
Keywords: Ellsberg paradox, Ambiguity, Quantum structures, Complex Hilbert spaces
1 Introduction
Traditional approaches in economics follow the hypothesis that agents’ behavior during a decision process
is mainly ruled by expected utility theory (EUT) [1, 2]. Roughly speaking, in presence of uncertain events,
decision makers choose in such a way that they maximize their utility, or satisfaction. Notwithstanding
its mathematical tractability and predictive success, the structural validity of EUT at the individual level
is questionable. Indeed, systematic empirical deviations from the predictions of EUT have been observed
which are usually referred to as paradoxes [3, 4].
EUT was formally elaborated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1]. They presented a set of axioms
that allow to represent decision–maker preferences over the set of acts (functions from the set of states of
the nature into the set of consequences) by a suitable functional Epu(.), for some Bernoulli utility function
u on the set of consequences and an objective probability measure p on the set of states of the nature. An
important aspect of EUT concerns the treatment of uncertainty. Knight had pointed out the difference
between risk and uncertainty reserving the term risk for situations that can be described by known (or
physical) probabilities, and the term uncertainty to refer to situations in which agents do not know the
1
Act red yellow black
f1 12$ 0$ 0$
f2 0$ 0$ 12$
f3 12$ 12$ 0$
f4 0$ 12$ 12$
Table 1: The payoff matrix for the Ellsberg paradox situation.
probabilities associated with each of the possible outcomes of an act [5]. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
modeling did not contemplate the latter possibility, since all probabilities are objectively, i.e. physically,
given in their scheme. For this reason, Savage extended EUT allowing agents to construct their own
subjective probabilities when physical probabilities are not available [2]. According to Savage’s model,
the distinction proposed by Knight seems however irrelevant. Ellsberg instead showed that Knightian’s
distinction is empirically meaningful [3]. In particular, he presented the following experiment. Consider
one urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either yellow or black, the latter in unknown proportion.
One ball will be drawn from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts
f1, f2, f3 and f4 defined in Tab. 1. When asked to rank these gambles most of the persons choose to bet
on f1 over f2 and f4 over f3. This preference cannot be explained by EUT. Indeed, individuals’ ranking
of the sub–acts [12 on red; 0 on black] versus [0 on red; 12 on black] depends upon whether the event
yellow yields a payoff of 0 or 12, contrary to what is suggested by the Sure–Thing principle, an important
axiom of Savage’s model.1 Nevertheless, these choices have a direct intuition: f1 offers the 12 prize with
an objective probability of 1/3, and f2 offers the same prize but in an element of the subjective partition
{black, yellow}. In the same way, f4 offers the prize with an objective probability of 2/3, whereas f3 offers
the same payoff on the union of the unambiguous event red and the ambiguous event yellow. Thus, in
both cases the unambiguous bet is preferred to its ambiguous counterpart, a phenomenon called ambiguity
aversion by Ellsberg.
Many extensions of EUT have been worked out to cope with Ellsberg–type preferences, which mainly
consist in replacing the Sure–Thing Principle by weaker axioms. We briefly summarize the most known,
as follows.
(i) Choquet expected utility. This model considers a subjective non–additive probability (or, capacity)
over the states of nature rather than a subjective probability. Thus, decision–makers could underestimate or
overestimate probabilities in the Ellsberg experiment, and ambiguity aversion is equivalent to the convexity
of the capacity (pessimistic beliefs) [6].
(ii) Max–Min expected utility. The lack of knowledge about the states of nature of the decision–maker
cannot be represented by a unique probability measure but, rather, by a set of probability measures. Then,
an act f is preferred to g iff minp∈P Epu(f) > minp∈P Epu(f), where P is a convex and closed set of additive
probability measures. Ambiguity aversion is represented by the pessimistic beliefs of the agent which takes
decisions considering the worst probabilistic scenario [7].
(iii) Variational preferences. In this dynamic generalization of the Max–Min expected utility, agents
rank acts according to the criterion infp∈△{Epu(f) + c(p)}, where c(p) is a closed and convex penalty
function associated with the probability election [8].
(iv) Second order probabilities. This is a model of preferences over acts where the decision–maker
1The Sure–Thing principle was stated by Savage by introducing the businessman example, but it can be presented in an
equivalent form, the independence axiom, as follows: if persons are indifferent in choosing between simple lotteries L1 and
L2, they will also be indifferent in choosing between L1 mixed with an arbitrary simple lottery L3 with probability p and L2
mixed with L3 with the same probability p.
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prefers act f to act g iff Eµφ(Epu(f)) > Eµφ (Epu(g)), where E is the expectation operator, u is a von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, φ is an increasing transformation, and µ is a subjective probability
over the set of probability measures p that the decision–maker thinks are feasible. Ambiguity aversion is
here represented by the concavity of the transformation φ [9].
Despite approaches (i)–(iv) have been widely used in economic and financial modeling, none of them
is immune of critics [4, 10]. And, worse, none of these models can satisfactorily represent more general
Ellsberg–type situations (e.g., theMachina paradox [4, 11]). As a consequence, the construction of a unified
perspective representing ambiguity is still an unachieved goal in economics and decision making.
We have recently inquired both conceptually and structurally into the above approaches generalizing
EUT [6, 7, 8, 9] to cope with ambiguity. The latter is defined as a situation without a probability model
describing it as opposed to risk, where a classical probability model on a σ–algebra of events is presupposed.
The generalizations in (i)–(iv) consider more general structures than a single classical probability model on
a σ–algebra. We are convinced that this is the point: ambiguity, due to its contextuality, structurally
need a non–classical probability model. To this end we have elaborated a general framework, based
on the notion of contextual risk and inspired by the probability structure of quantum mechanics, which
is intrinsically different from a classical probability on a σ-algebra, the set of events is indeed not a
Boolean algebra [13, 14, 15, 16]. Inspired by this approach, we work out in the present article a complete
mathematical representation of the Ellsberg paradox situation (states, payoffs, acts, preferences) in the
standard mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, hence by using a complex Hilbert space, and
representing the probability measures by means of projection valued measures on this complex Hilbert
space [17] (Sect. 2). This analysis leads us to claim that the structure of the probability models is
essentially different from the ones of known approaches – projection valued measures instead of σ–algebra
valued measures [12]. But, more important, also the way in which states are represented in quantum
mechanics, i.e. by unit vectors of the Hilbert space, introduces a fundamentally different aspect, coping
both mathematically and intuitively with the notion of ambiguity as introduced in economics. Successively,
we analyze the experimental data we collected in a statistically relevant experiment we performed, where real
decision–makers were asked to bet on the different acts defined by the Ellsberg paradox situation [13, 14]
(Sect. 3). We show that our quantum mechanical model faithfully represents the subjects’ preferences
together with experimental statistics. Furthermore, we describe the choices between acts f1/f2 and between
acts f3/f4 by quantum observables represented by compatible spectral families (Sect. 4). We finally prove
that the requirement of compatibility of the latter observables makes it necessary to introduce a Hilbert
space over complex numbers, namely that imaginary numbers are needed since our experimental data
cannot be modeled in a real Hilbert space, i.e. a vector space over real numbers only, in case we want the
observables representing our experiment to be compatible (Sect. 5). Complex numbers in quantum theory
stand for the quantum effect of interference, and indeed, we can identify in our modeling how interference
produces the typical Ellsberg deviation leading to measured data in our experiment. These results strongly
suggest that, more generally, ‘ambiguity laden’ situations can be explained in terms of the appearance of
typically quantum effects, namely, contextuality – our quantum model is contextual, see the discussion
on context in Sect. 2 –, superposition – we explicitly use superposition to construct the quantum states
representing the Ellsberg bet situations in Sect. 2 – and interference – i.e. complex numbers –, and that
quantum structures have the capacity to mathematically deal with this type of situations. Hence, our
findings naturally fit within the growing ‘quantum interaction research’ which mainly applies quantum
structures to cognitive situations [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
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2 A quantum model in Hilbert space for the Ellsberg paradox
We have recently worked out a Hilbert space model for the Ellsberg paradox situation [17]. Here we deepen
our Hilbert space representation of the Ellsberg situation and derive new results elaborating the already
obtained ones. But we first need to anticipate a discussion on the notions of ‘context’ and ‘contextual
influence’ and how they are used in the present framework. The notion of context typically denotes what
does not pertain to the entity under study but that can interact with it. In the foundations of quantum
mechanics, context more specifically indicates the ‘measurement context’, which influences the measured
quantum entity in a stochastic way. As a consequence of this contextual interaction, the state of the
quantum entity changes, thus determining a transition from potential to actual. A quantum mechanical
context is represented by a self-adjoint operator or, equivalently, by a spectral family. An analogous effect
occurs in a decision process, where there is generally a contextual influence (of a cognitive nature) having
its origin in the way the mind of the person involved in the decision, e.g., a choice between two bets, relates
to the situation that is the subject of the decision making, e.g., the Ellsberg situation. This is why, in
our analysis of the Ellsberg paradox, we use the definition and representation of context and contextual
influence to indicate the cognitive interaction taking place between the conceptual Ellsberg situation and
the human mind in a decision process. We are now ready to proceed with our quantum modeling.
To this end let us consider the situation illustrated in Tab. 1, Sect. 1. The simplest Hilbert space that
can supply a faithful modeling of the Ellsberg situation is the three dimensional complex Hilbert space C3
whose canonical basis we denote by {|1, 0, 0〉, |0, 1, 0〉, |0, 0, 1〉}. We introduce the model in different steps:
we will see that in each of them, quantum structures enable a new and satisfying way to model an aspect
of ambiguity. At the last step it will be made clear that modeling the agents’ decisions at a statistical level
requires the full probabilistic apparatus of quantum mechanics, that is, both states and measurements.
2.1 The conceptual Ellsberg entity
The first part of the model consists of the Ellsberg situation without considering neither the different
acts nor the person nor the bet to be taken. Hence it is the situation of the urn with 30 red balls and
60 black and yellow balls in unknown proportion (conceptual Ellsberg entity). Already at this stage, the
presence of ambiguity can be mathematically taken into account by means of the quantum mechanical
formalism. To this aim we introduce a quantum mechanical context e and represent it by means of the
family {Pr, Pyb}, where Pr is the one dimensional orthogonal projection operator on the subspace generated
by the unit vector |1, 0, 0〉, and Pyb is the two dimensional orthogonal projection operator on the subspace
generated by the unit vectors |0, 1, 0〉 and |0, 0, 1〉. {Pr, Pyb} is a spectral family, since Pr ⊥ Pyb and
Pr + Pyb = 1. Contexts, more specifically measurement contexts, are represented by spectral families
of orthogonal projection operators (equivalently, by a self–adjoint operator determined by such a family)
also in quantum mechanics. Again in analogy with quantum mechanics, we represent the states of the
conceptual Ellsberg entity by means of unit vectors of C3. For example, the unit vector
|vry〉 = | 1√
3
eiθr ,
√
2
3
eiθy , 0〉 (1)
can be used to represent a state describing the Ellsberg situation. Indeed, the probability for ‘red’ in the
state pvry represented by |vry〉 is
|〈1, 0, 0|vry〉|2 = 〈vry|1, 0, 0〉〈1, 0, 0|vry 〉 =‖ Pr|vry〉 ‖2= 1
3
(2)
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Moreover, the probability for ‘yellow or black’ in the state pvry represented by |vry〉 is
‖ Pyb|vry〉 ‖2= 〈0,
√
2
3
eiθy , 0|0,
√
2
3
eiθy , 0〉 = 2
3
(3)
But this is not the only state describing the Ellsberg situation. For example, the unit vector
|vrb〉 = | 1√
3
eiφr , 0,
√
2
3
eiφb〉 (4)
also represents a state describing the Ellsberg situation. We thus denote the set of all states describing the
Ellsberg situation (Ellsberg state set) by
ΣElls = {pv : |v〉 = | 1√
3
eiθr , ρye
iθy , ρbe
iθb〉 | 0 ≤ ρy, ρb, ρ2y + ρ2b =
2
3
} (5)
which is associated with a subset (not necessarily a linear subspace) of C3. If a state belongs to ΣElls, this
state delivers a quantum description of the Ellsberg situation, together with the context e represented by
the spectral family {Pr, Pyb} in C3.
2.2 Modeling acts and utility
In the second step of our construction, we describe the different acts f1, f2, f3 and f4. Here a second
measurement context g is introduced. The context g describes the ball taken out of the urn and its color
verified, red, yellow or black. Also g is represented by a spectral family of orthogonal projection operators
{Pr, Py , Pb}, where Pr is already defined, while Py is the orthogonal projection operator on |0, 1, 0〉 and Pb
is the orthogonal projection operator on |0, 0, 1〉. Thus, the probabilities µr(g, pv), µy(g, pv) and µb(g, pv)
of drawing a red ball, a yellow ball and a black ball, respectively, in a state pv represented by the unit
vector |v〉 = |ρreiθr , ρyeiθy , ρbeiθb〉 are
µr(g, pv) =‖ Pr|v〉 ‖2= 〈v|Pr |v〉 = ρ2r (6)
µy(g, pv) =‖ Py|v〉 ‖2= 〈v|Py |v〉 = ρ2y (7)
µb(g, pv) =‖ Pb|v〉 ‖2= 〈v|Pb|v〉 = ρ2b (8)
The acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 are observables in our modeling, hence they are represented by self-adjoint
operators, built on the spectral decomposition {Pr, Py, Pb}. More specifically, we have
F1 = 12$Pr (9)
F2 = 12$Pb (10)
F3 = 12$Pr + 12$Py (11)
F4 = 12$Py + 12$Pb = 12$Pyb (12)
Let us now analyze the expected payoffs and the utility connected with the different acts. For the sake of
simplicity, we identify here the utility with the expected payoff, which implies that we are considering risk
neutral agents. Consider an arbitrary state pv ∈ ΣElls and the acts f1 and f4. We have
U(f1, g, pv) = 〈pv|F1|pv〉 = 12$ · 1
3
= 4$ (13)
U(f4, g, pv) = 〈pv|F4|pv〉 = 12$ · 2
3
= 8$ (14)
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which shows that both these utilities are completely independent of the considered state of ΣElls, i.e. they
are ambiguity free. Consider now the acts f2 and f3, and again an arbitrary state pv ∈ ΣElls. We have
U(f2, g, pv) = 〈pv|F2|pv〉 = 12$µb(g, pv) (15)
U(f3, g, pv) = 〈pv|F3|pv〉 = 12$(µr(g, pv) + µy(g, pv)) (16)
which shows that both utilities strongly depend on the state pv, due to the ambiguity the two acts are
confronted with. This can be significantly revealed by considering two extreme cases. Let pvry and pvrb be
the states represented by the vectors |vry〉 and |vrb〉 in Eqs. (1) and (4), respectively. These states give rise
for the act f2 to utilities
U(f2, g, pvry ) = 12$µb(g, pvry ) = 12$ · 0 = 0$ (17)
U(f2, g, pvrb) = 12$µb(g, pvrb) = 12$ ·
2
3
= 8$. (18)
This shows that a state pvrb exists within the realm of ambiguity, where the utility of act f2 is greater than
the utility of act f1, and also a state pvry exists within the realm of ambiguity, where the utility of act f2
is smaller than the utility of act f1. If we look at act f3, we find for the two considered extreme states the
following utilities
U(f3, g, pvry ) = 12$(µr(g, pvry) + µy(g, pvry)) = 12$(
1
3
+
2
3
) = 12$ (19)
U(f3, g, pvrb) = 12$(µr(g, pvrb) + µy(g, pvrb)) = 12$(
1
3
+ 0) = 4$. (20)
Analogously, namely the state pvry gives rise to a greater utility, while the state pvrb gives rise to a smaller
utility than the independent one obtained in act f4.
2.3 Decision making and superposition states
The third step of our modeling consists in taking directly into account the role played by ambiguity. We
proceed as follows [21].
We suppose that the two extreme states pvry and pvrb in Sect. 2.1 are relevant in the mind of the person
that is asked to bet. Hence, it is a superposition state of these two states that will guide the decision
process during the bet. Let us construct a general superposition state pvs of these two states. Hence the
vector |vs〉 representing pvs can be written as
|vs〉 = aeiα|vrb〉+ beiβ |vry〉 (21)
where a, b, α and β are chosen in such a way that 〈vs|vs〉 = 1, which means that
1 = a2 + b2 +
2ab
3
cos(β − α+ θr − φr) (22)
or, equivalently,
cos(β − α+ θr − φr) = 3(1− a
2 − b2)
2ab
(23)
The amplitude of the state pvs with the first basis vector |1, 0, 0〉 is given by
〈1, 0, 0|vs〉 = a√
3
ei(α+φr) +
b√
3
ei(β+θr) (24)
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Therefore, the transition probability is
|〈1, 0, 0|vs〉|2 = 1
3
(a2 + b2 + 3− 3a2 − 3b2) = 1
3
(3− 2a2 − 2b2) = µr(g, pvs) (25)
as one can easily verify. Analogously, the amplitudes with the second and third basis vectors are given by
〈0, 1, 0|vs〉 = aeiα〈0, 1, 0|vrb〉+ beiβ〈0, 1, 0|vry〉 =
√
2
3
bei(β+θy) (26)
〈0, 0, 1|vs〉 = aeiα〈0, 0, 1|vrb〉+ beiβ〈0, 0, 1|vry〉 =
√
2
3
aei(α+θb) (27)
respectively. Therefore, the transition probabilities are
|〈0, 1, 0|vs〉|2 = 2
3
b2 = µy(g, pvs) (28)
|〈0, 0, 1|vs〉|2 = 2
3
a2 = µb(g, pvs) (29)
From the foregoing follows that a general superposition state is represented by the unit vector
|vs〉 = 1√
3
|aei(α+φr) + bei(β+θr),
√
2bei(β+θy),
√
2aei(α+θb)〉 (30)
and that the utilities corresponding to the different acts are given by
U(f1, g, pvs) = 〈vs|F1|vs〉 = 4$(3− 2a2 − 2b2) (31)
U(f2, g, pvs) = 〈vs|F2|vs〉 = 4$ · 2a2 (32)
U(f3, g, pvs) = 〈vs|F3|vs〉 = 4$ · (3− 2a2) (33)
U(f4, g, pvs) = 〈vs|F4|vs〉 = 4$(2a2 + 2b2) (34)
We can see that it is not necessarily the case that µr(g, pvs) =
1
3 , which means that choices of a and b can
be made such that the superposition state pvs /∈ ΣElls. The reason is that ΣElls is not a linearly closed
subset of C3.
Let us then consider some of the extreme possibilities of superpositions. We remind that the latter
superpositions are not relevant for the modeling of the Ellsberg paradox as it was originally formulated,
but they come into play if one wants to represent more general Ellsberg-type situations. For example,
choose a = b =
√
3
2 . Then we have µy(g, pvs) =
2
3 · 34 = 12 , µb(g, pvs) = 23 · 34 = 12 , and µr(g, pvs) = 0, and
cos(β − α+ θr − φr) = 3(1−a
2−b2)
2ab = −1, hence β = pi + α− θr + φr. Thus, the state represented by
|vs(yb)〉 =
√
3
2
(eiα|vrb〉+ ei(pi+α−θr+φr)|vry〉) (35)
gives rise to probability zero for a red ball to be drawn. Another extreme choice is, when we take a = b =√
3
8 . Then we have µy(g, pvs) =
2
3 · 38 = 14 , µb(g, pvs) = 23 · 38 = 14 and µr(g, pvs) = 12 , and cos(β−α+θr−φr) =
+1, which means β = α− θr + φr. Hence, the state
|vs(r)〉 =
√
3
8
(eiα|vrb〉+ ei(α−θr+φr)|vry〉) (36)
gives rise to probability 12 for a red ball to be drawn. These are extreme superposition states which are not
compatible with the situation as formulated by Ellsberg, but they could be useful if suitable Ellsberg–type
extensions are taken into account.
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To construct non–trivial superpositions that retain probability 13 for drawing a red ball, we require that
1
3
= µr(g, pvs) =
1
3
(3− 2a2 − 2b2) (37)
or, equivalently,
a2 + b2 = 1 (38)
which implies that cos(β − α+ θr − φr) = 0, hence β = pi2 + α− θr + φr.
Let us construct now two examples of superposition states that conserve the 13 probability for drawing
a red ball, and hence are conservative superpositions, and express ambiguity as is thought to be the case
in the Ellsberg paradox situation. The first state refers to the comparison for a bet between f1 and f2.
The ambiguity of not knowing the number of yellow and black balls in the urn, only their sum to be
60, as compared to knowing the number of red balls in the urn to be 30, gives rise to the thought that
‘eventually there are perhaps almost no black balls and hence an abundance of yellow balls’. Jointly, and
in superposition, the thought also comes that ‘it is of course also possible that there are more black balls
than yellow balls’. These two thoughts in superposition, are mathematically represented by a state pvs .
The state pvs will be closer to pvry , the extreme state with no black balls, if the person is deeply ambiguity
averse, while it will be closer to pvrb , the extreme state with no yellow balls, if the person is attracted by
ambiguity. Hence, these two tendencies are expressed by the values of a and b in the superposition state.
If we consider again the utilities, this time with a2 + b2 = 1, we have
U(f1, g, pvs) = 4$ (39)
U(f2, g, pvs) = 4$ · 2a2 (40)
U(f3, g, pvs) = 4$ · (3− 2a2) (41)
U(f4, g, pvs) = 8$ (42)
So, for a2 < 12 , which exactly means that the superposition state pvs is closer to the state pvry than to the
state pvrb , we have that U(f2, g, pvs) < U(f1, g, pvs), and hence a person with strong ambiguity aversion in
the situation of the first bet, will then prefer to bet on f1 and not on f2. Let us choose a concrete state for
the bet between f1 and f2, and call it pv12s , and denote its superposition state by |v12s 〉. Hence, for |v12s 〉 we
take a = 12 and b =
√
3
2 and hence a
2 = 14 and b
2 = 34 . For the angles we must have β − α + θr − φr = pi2 ,
hence let us choose θr = φr = 0, α = 0, and β =
pi
2 . This gives us
|v12s 〉 =
1
2
√
3
|1 +
√
3ei
pi
2 ,
√
2
√
3ei
pi
2 ,
√
2〉 = 1
2
√
3
|1 + i
√
3, i
√
6,
√
2〉 (43)
On the other hand, for 12 < a
2, which means that the superposition state is closer to the state pvrb than
to the state pvry , we have that U(f3, g, pvs) < U(f4, g, pvs), and hence a person with strong ambiguity
aversion in the situation of the second bet, will then prefer to bet on f4 and not on f3. Also for this case
we construct an explicit state, let us call it pv23s , and denote it by the vector |v34s 〉. Hence, for |v34s 〉 we take
a =
√
3
2 and b =
1
2 and hence a
2 = 34 and b
2 = 14 . For the angles we must have β − α+ θr − φr = pi2 , hence
let us choose θr = φr = 0, α = 0, and β =
pi
2 . This gives us
|v34s 〉 =
1
2
√
3
|
√
3 + ei
pi
2 ,
√
2ei
pi
2 ,
√
2
√
3〉 = 1
2
√
3
|
√
3 + i, i
√
2,
√
6〉 (44)
The superposition states p12vs and p
34
vs
representing the unit vectors |v12s 〉 and |v34s 〉, respectively, will be
used in the next sections to provide a faithful modeling of a concrete experiment in which decisions are
expressed by real agents.
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3 An experiment testing the Ellsberg paradox
We have observed in the previous sections that genuine quantum aspects intervene in the description of the
Ellsberg paradox. This will be even more evident from the analysis of a statistically relevant experiment
we performed of this paradox, whose results were firstly reported in [14]. To perform the experiment we
sent out the following text to several people, consisting of a mixture of friends, relatives and students, to
avoid as much as possible a statistical selection bias.
We are conducting a small-scale statistics investigation into a particular problem and would like to
invite you to participate as test subjects. Please note that it is not the aim for this problem to be resolved
in terms of correct or incorrect answers. It is your preference for a particular choice we want to test. The
question concerns the following situation. Imagine an urn containing 90 balls of three different colors: red
balls, black balls and yellow balls. We know that the number of red balls is 30 and that the sum of the
the black balls and the yellow balls is 60. The questions of our investigation are about the situation where
somebody randomly takes one ball from the urn.
(i) The first question is about a choice to be made between two bets: bet f1 and bet f2. Bet f1 involves
winning ‘10 euros when the ball is red’ and ‘zero euros when it is black or yellow’. Bet f2 involves winning
‘10 euros when the ball is black’ and ‘zero euros when it is red or yellow’. The question we would ask you
to answer is: Which of the two bets, bet f1 or bet f2, would you prefer?
(ii) The second question is again about a choice between two different bets, bet f3 and bet f4. Bet f3
involves winning ‘10 euros when the ball is red or yellow’ and ‘zero euros when the ball is black’. Bet f4
involves winning ‘10 euros when the ball is black or yellow’ and ‘zero euros when the ball is red’. The
second question therefore is: Which of the two bets, bet f3 or bet f4, would you prefer?
Please provide in your reply message the following information.
For question 1, your preference (your choice between bet f1 and bet f2). For question 2, your preference
(your choice between bet f3 and bet f4). By ‘preference’ we mean ‘the bet you would take if this situation
happened to you in real life’. You are expected to choose one of the bets for each of the questions, i.e. ‘not
choosing is no option’. You are welcome to provide a brief explanation of your preferences, which may be
of a purely intuitive nature, only mentioning feelings, for example, but this is not required. It is all right if
you only state your preferences without giving any explanation.
One final remark about the colors. Your choices should not be affected by any personal color preference.
If you feel that the colors of the example somehow have an influence on your choices, you should restate the
problem and take colors that are indifferent to yours, if this does not work, use other neutral characteristics
to distinguish the balls.
Let us now analyze the obtained results.
We had 59 respondents participating in our test of the Ellsberg paradox problem, which is the typical
number of participants in experiments on psychological effect of the type studied by Kahneman and Tversky,
such as the conjunction fallacy, and the disjunction effect. (see, e.g., [29, 30]). We do believe that ambiguity
aversion is a psychological effect within this calls of effects, which means that in case our hypothesis on
the nature of ambiguity aversion is correct, our test is significant. This being said, it would certainly be
interesting to make a similar test with a larger number of participants, which is something we plan for
the future. We however also remark that the quantum modeling scheme is general enough to also model
statistical data that are different from the ones collected in this specific test. Next to this remark, we
want to point out that in the present paper we want to prove that these real data ‘can’ be modeled in our
approach.
The answers of the participants were distributed as follows: (a) 34 subjects preferred bets f1 and f4;
(b) 12 subjects preferred bets f2 and f3; (c) 7 subjects preferred bets f2 and f4; (d) 6 subjects preferred
bets f1 and f3. This makes the weights with preference of bet f1 over bet f2 to be 0.68 against 0.32, and
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the weights with preference of bet f4 over bet f3 to be 0.69 against 0.31. It is worth to note that 34+12=46
people chose the combination of bet f1 and bet f4 or bet f2 and bet f3, which is 78%. In Sect. 4 we apply
our quantum mechanical model to these experimental data.
4 Quantum modeling the experiment
As anticipated in Sect. 2.3, we take into account the superposition states p12vs and p
34
vs
to put forward
a description of the choices made by the participants in the test described in Sect. 3. We employ in
this section the spectral methods that are typically used in quantum mechanics to construct self–adjoint
operators.
First we consider the choice to bet on f1 or on f2. This is a choice with two possible outcomes, let us
call them o1 and o2. Thus, we introduce two projection operators P1 and P2 on the Hilbert space C
3, and
represent the observable associated with the first bet by the self–adjoint operator (spectral decomposition)
O12 = o1P1 + o2P2. Then, we consider the choice to bet on f3 or on f4. This is a choice with two possible
outcomes too, let us call them o3 and o4. Thus, we introduce two projection operators P3 and P4 on
C
3, and represent the observable associated with the second bet by the self–adjoint operator (spectral
decomposition) O34 = o3P3 + o4P4.
To model the empirical data in Sect. 3, we recall that we tested in our experiment 59 participants, and
40 preferred f1 over f2, while the remaining 19 preferred f2 over f1. This means that we should construct
P1 and P2 in such a way that
〈v12s |P1|v12s 〉 =
40
59
= 0.68 〈v12s |P2|v12s 〉 =
19
59
= 0.32 (45)
In our experiment of the 59 participants there were 41 preferring f4 over f3, and 18 who choose the other
way around. Hence, we should have
〈v34s |P3|v34s 〉 =
18
59
= 0.31 〈v34s |P4|v34s 〉 =
41
59
= 0.69 (46)
Both bets should give rise to no preference, hence probabilities 12 in all cases, when there is no ambiguity,
when the state is pvc represented by the vector
|vc〉 = | 1√
3
,
1√
3
,
1√
3
〉 (47)
Let us preliminarily denote by S121 , S122 , S343 and S344 the eigenspaces associated with the eigenvalues o1,
o2, o3 and o4, respectively. We can assume that S122 and S344 are one dimensional, and S121 and S343 are two
dimensional, without loss of generality. Then, we prove the following two theorems.
Theorem 1. If, under the hypothesis on the eigenspaces formulated above, the two self–adjoint operators
(spectral decompositions) O12 = o1P1+o2P2 and O34 = o3P3+o4P4 are such that [O12,O34] = 0 in C3, then
two situations are possible, (i) an orthonormal basis {|e1〉, |e2〉, |e3〉} of common eigenvectors exists such
that P1 = |e1〉〈e1| + |e2〉〈e2|, P2 = |e3〉〈e3|, P3 = |e2〉〈e2| + |e3〉〈e3| and P4 = |e1〉〈e1|, or (ii) O12 = O34,
and hence S122 = S344 and S121 = S343 .
Proof. Suppose that O12 6= O34. Since S122 and S344 are one dimensional, we can choose |e1〉 and |e3〉
unit vectors respectively in S122 and S344 . Since [O12,O34] = 0 it follows that [P2, P4] = 0, and hence
|e1〉 ⊥ |e3〉 or |e1〉 = λ|e2〉 for some λ ∈ C. But, if |e1〉 = λ|e2〉, we have S122 = S344 , and hence S121 =
(S122 )⊥ = (S344 )⊥ = S343 , which entails O12 = O34. Hence, we have |e1〉 ⊥ |e3〉. Since S121 and S343 are
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both two dimensional, their intersection is one dimensional, or they are equal. If they are equal, then
also their orthogocomplements are equal, and this would entail again that O12 = O34. Hence, we have
that their intersection is one dimensional. We choose |e2〉 a unit vector contained in this intersection,
and hence |e2〉 ⊥ |e1〉 and |e2〉 ⊥ |e3〉. This means that {|e1〉, |e2〉, |e3〉} is an orthonormal basis, and
P1 = |e1〉〈e1|+ |e2〉〈e2|, P2 = |e3〉〈e3|, P3 = |e2〉〈e2|+ |e3〉〈e3| and P4 = |e1〉〈e1|.
Theorem 2. For the data of our experiment exist compatible self-adjoint operators, hence, following the
notations introduced, O12 6= O34 such that [O12,O34] = 0, modeling both bets. This means that, again
following the notations introduced, that we have
〈e1|e1〉 = 〈e2|e2〉 = 〈e3|e3〉 = 1 (48)
〈e1|e2〉 = 〈e1|e3〉 = 〈e2|e3〉 = 0 (49)
|〈v12s |e1〉|2 + |〈v12s |e2〉|2 = 0.68 (50)
|〈v12s |e3〉|2 = 0.32 (51)
|〈v34s |e2〉|2 + |〈v34s |e3〉|2 = 0.31 (52)
|〈v34s |e1〉|2 = 0.69 (53)
|〈vc|e1〉|2 + |〈vc|e2〉|2 = 0.5 = |〈vc|e3〉|2 (54)
|〈vc|e2〉|2 + |〈vc|e3〉|2 = 0.5 = |〈vc|e1〉|2 (55)
Proof. We can explicitly construct an orthonormal basis {|e1〉, |e2〉, |e3〉} which simultaneously satisfies Eqs.
(48)–(55). We omit the explicit construction, for the sake of brevity, and we only report the solution, as
follows. The orthonormal vectors |e1〉 and |e3〉 are respectively given by
|e1〉 = |0.38ei61.2◦ , 0.13ei248.4◦ , 0.92ei194.4◦ 〉 (56)
|e3〉 = |0.25ei251.27◦ , 0.55ei246.85◦ , 0.90ei218.83◦ 〉 (57)
One can then construct at once a unit vector |e2〉 orthogonal to both |e1〉 and |e3〉, which we don’t do
explicitly, again for the sake of brevity.
Theorems 1 and 2 entail that within our quantum modeling approach the two bets can be represented
by commuting observables such that the statistical data of the real experiment are faithfully modeled.
Then, the following orthogonal projection operators model the agents’ decisions.
P2 = |e3〉〈e3| =

 0.06 0.14e
i4.42◦ 0.23ei32.44
◦
0.14e−i4.42
◦
0.30 0.49ei28.02
◦
0.23e−i32.44
◦
0.49e−i28.02
◦
0.81

 (58)
and
P4 = |e1〉〈e1| =

 0.14 0.05e
−i187.2◦ 0.35e−i133.2
◦
0.05ei187.2
◦
0.02 0.12ei54
◦
0.35ei133.2
◦
0.12e−i54
◦
0.85

 (59)
Thus, P1 = 1− P2 and P3 = 1− P4 can be easily calculated.
Let us now come to the representation of the observables. The observable associated with the preference
between f1 and f2 is then represented by the self–adjoint operator (spectral decomposition) O12, while the
observable associated with the preference between f3 and f4 is represented by the self–adjoint operator
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(spectral decomposition) O34. More explicitly, if we set o1 = o3 = 1 and o2 = o4 = −1, we get the following
explicit representations.
O12 = P1 − P2 = 1− 2P2
=

 0.87 −0.28e
i4.42◦ −0.46ei32.44◦
−0.28e−i4.42◦ 0.40 −0.98ei28.02◦
−0.45e−i32.44◦ −0.98e−i28.02◦ −0.62

 (60)
O34 = P3 − P4 = 1− 2P4
=

 0.71 −0.10e
−i187.2◦ −0.70e−i133.2◦
−0.10ei187.2◦ 0.97 −0.24ei54◦
−0.70ei133.2◦ −0.24e−i54◦ −0.69

 (61)
A direct calculation of the commutator operator [O12,O34] reveals that the corresponding observables are
indeed compatible.
5 A real vector space analysis
We show in this section that the possibility of representing the experimental data in Sect. 3 by compatible
measurements for the bets relies crucially on our choice of a Hilbert space over complex numbers as a
modeling space. Indeed, if a Hilbert space over real numbers is attempted, no compatible the observables
for the bets and the data in Sect. 4 can be constructed any longer, as our analysis in this section reveals.
Let us indeed attempt to represent the Ellsberg paradox situation in the real Hilbert space R3. This
comes to allowing only values of 0 and pi for the phases of the complex vectors in Sect. 2.3. It is then easy
to see that the only conservative superpositions that remain are the extreme states themselves, that is,
|v12s 〉 = |vry〉 = | ±
1√
3
,±
√
2
3
, 0〉 (62)
|v34s 〉 = |vrb〉 = | ±
1√
3
, 0,±
√
2
3
〉 (63)
This means that superposition states such as |v12s 〉 and |v34s 〉 are only conservative, in case complex numbers
are used for the superposition. This is a first instance of the necessity of complex numbers for a quantum
modeling of the Ellsberg situation, because indeed, we should be able to represent the priors, hence the
quantum states, by superpositions, of the extreme states, and not by the extreme states themselves. But,
let us prove that even if we opt for representing the quantum states by the extreme states, that no real
Hilbert space representation with compatible observables modeling the bets and are experimental data is
possible.
Taking into account the content of Theorems 1, and making use of the notations introduced, we can
state the following: For a compatible solution to exist, we need to find two unit vectors, let us denote
them |x〉 and |y〉, such that they are elements of the one dimensional eigenspaces |x〉 ∈ S122 and |y〉 ∈ S344
respectively. For case (i) of Theorems 1 to be satisfied, this is the case where the self-adjoint operators
representing the compatible measurements are different, we have that |x〉 needs to be orthogonal to |y〉,
which we can express as 〈x|y〉 = 0. For the case (ii) of Theorems 1 to be satisfied, this is the case where
the self-adjoint operators representing the compatible measurements are equal, we have that |x〉 needs to
be a multiple of |y〉, and since both are unit vectors, and we work in a real Hilbert space, this means that
|x〉 = ±|y〉. This can be expressed as 〈x|y〉 = ±1. In the following we will prove that such |x〉 and |y〉 do
not exist in a real Hilbert space.
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In our proof we start by supposing that these vectors exist and find a contradiction. Let us put
|x〉 = |a, b, c〉 and |y〉 = |d, f, g〉. Since |x〉 and |y〉 are unit vectors, we have 1 = a2+ b2+ c2 = d2+ f2+ g2.
Generalizing Eqs. (51), (53), (54) and (55) to considering the two cases (i) and (ii) of Theorems 1 we must
have the following equations satisfied for the vectors |x〉 and |y〉.
1
2
= |〈 1√
3
,
1√
3
,
1√
3
|a, b, c〉|2
=
1
3
(a+ b+ c)2 =
1
3
(a2 + b2 + c2 + 2ab+ 2ac + 2bc) (64)
0.69 = |〈 1√
3
, 0,
√
2
3
|a, b, c〉|2
=
1
3
(a+
√
2c)2 =
1
3
(a2 + 2c2 + 2
√
2ac) (65)
1
2
= |〈 1√
3
,
1√
3
,
1√
3
|d, f, g〉|2
=
1
3
(d+ f + g)2 =
1
3
(d2 + f2 + g2 + 2df + 2dg + 2fg) (66)
0.32 = |〈 1√
3
,
√
2
3
, 0|d, f, g〉|2
=
1
3
(d+
√
2f)2 =
1
3
(d2 + 2f2 + 2
√
2df) (67)
We stress that we have considered here the ++ signs choices for |v12s 〉 and |v34s 〉. We will later consider the
other possibilities. Elaborating we get the following set of equations to be satisfied
1 = a2 + b2 + c2 (68)
1.5 = a2 + b2 + c2 + 2ab+ 2ac+ 2bc (69)
2.07 = a2 + 2c2 + 2
√
2ac (70)
1 = d2 + f2 + g2 (71)
1.5 = d2 + f2 + g2 + 2df + 2dg + 2fg (72)
0.96 = d2 + 2f2 + 2
√
2df (73)
The points (a, b, c) satisfying Eq. (69) lie on a cone in the origin and centred around |vc〉, and the points
(a, b, c) satisfying Eq. (70) lie on a cone in the origin and centred around |v34s 〉. Hence Eqs. (69) and (70)
can only jointly be satisfied where these two cones intersect. Further need (a, b, c) to be the coordinates
of a unit vector, which is expressed by Eq. (68). For two cones there are in a three dimensional real
space only two possibilities, or they cut each other in two lines through the origin, or they do not have
an intersection different from the origin. On two lines through the origin, four unit vectors can be found
always. This means that Eqs. (68), (69) and (70) have four solutions, or none. We are in a situation here
of four solutions, which are the following
1 a = 0.052 b = 0.192 c = 0.980 (74)
2 a = −0.931 b = 0.065 c = −0.359 (75)
3 a = −0.052 b = −0.192 c = −0.980 (76)
4 a = 0.931 b = −0.065 c = 0.359 (77)
Also the solutions of Eqs. (71), (72) and (73) are four points on the two intersecting lines of a cone, or
none, if the cones do not intersect. In the situation corresponding to our experimental data, we also here
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find four solutions, which are
1 d = 0.969 f = 0.008 g = 0.248 (78)
2 d = 0.154 f = −0.802 g = −0.577 (79)
3 d = −0.969 f = −0.008 g = −0.248 (80)
4 d = −0.154 f = 0.802 g = 0.577 (81)
Our proof follows now easily, when we verify that none of these solutions represent allows |x〉 and |y〉 to be
an orthogonal pair of vectors, or a pair of vectors equal to each other, or to ones opposite. We can verify
this by calculating the number 〈x|y〉, and seeing that they are all different from 0, different from +1, and
different from -1. We indeed have
〈e1|e3〉11 = 0.296 〈e1|e3〉12 = −0.711 (82)
〈e1|e3〉13 = −0.296 〈e1|e4〉13 = 0.711 (83)
〈e1|e3〉21 = −0.990 〈e1|e3〉22 = 0.011 (84)
〈e1|e3〉23 = 0.990 〈e1|e3〉24 = −0.011 (85)
〈e1|e3〉31 = −0.296 〈e1|e3〉32 = 0.711 (86)
〈e1|e3〉33 = 0.296 〈e1|e4〉33 = −0.711 (87)
〈e1|e3〉41 = 0.990 〈e1|e3〉42 = −0.011 (88)
〈e1|e3〉43 = −0.990 〈e1|e3〉44 = 0.011 (89)
To complete our proof of the non-existence of compatible observables in a real Hilbert space, we need to
analyse also all the other possibilities, i.e. all possible choices of + and − for |v12s 〉 and |v34s 〉. This can
be done completely along the same lines of the above, and hence we do not represent it explicitly here.
We have however verified all cases carefully, and indeed, none of the possibilities lead to vectors |x〉 and
|y〉 such that their in product 〈x|y〉 equals 0, +1, or -1. This completes our proof of the impossibility to
model our experimental data for the considered bets, such that these bets are represented by commuting
self-adjoint operators, hence compatible measurements, in a real Hilbert space.
The above result is relevant, in our opinion, and we think it is worth to discuss it more in detail.
The existence of compatible observables to represent the decision-makers’ choice among the different acts
in our experiment on the Ellsberg paradox is a direct consequence of the fact that we used a complex
Hilbert space as a modeling space. As we have proved in this section, if one instead uses a real vector
space, then the collected experimental data cannot be reproduced by compatible observables. Hence,
one has two possibilities, in this case. Either one requires that compatible observables exist that accord
with an Ellsberg-type situation, and then one has to accept a complex Hilbert space representation where
ambiguity aversion is coded into superposed quantum states, and these superpositions are of the ‘complex
type’, hence entailing genuine interference – when superpositions are with complex (non real) coefficient,
this means that the quantum effect of interference is present. Alternatively, one can use a representation
in a real vector space but, then, one should accept that an Ellserg-type situation cannot be reproduced
by compatible observables. In either case, the appearance of quantum structures – interference due to the
presence of genuine complex numbers, or incompatibility due to the impossibility to represent the data by
compatible measurements – seems unavoidable in the Ellsberg paradox situation.
Our quantum theoretic modeling of the Ellsberg paradox situation is thus completed. We however want
to add some explanatory remarks concerning the novelty of our approach, as follows.
(i) We have incorporated the subjective preference of traditional economics approaches in the quantum
state describing the conceptual Ellsberg entity. At variance with existing proposals, the subjective prefer-
ence coded in the quantum state can be different for each one of the acts fj, since it is not derived from
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any prefixed mathematical rule. Therefore, we can naturally explain a situation with f1 preferred to f2
and f4 preferred to f3, without the need of assuming extra hypotheses.
(ii) In the present paper, we have detected genuine quantum aspects in the description of the Ellsberg
paradox situation, namely, contextuality, superposition, and the ensuing interference. Further deepening
and experimenting most probably will reveal other quantum aspects. Hence the hypothesis that quantum
effects, of a conceptual nature, concretely drive decision–makers’ behavior in uncertainty situations is
warranted.
(iii) We have focused here on the Ellsberg paradox. But, our quantum theoretic modeling is sufficiently
general to cope with various generalizations of the Ellsberg paradox, which are problematical in traditional
economics approaches, such as the Machina paradox [17]. This opens the way toward the construction
of a unified framework extending standard expected utility and modeling ‘ambiguity laden’ situations in
economics and decision theory.
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